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By Alfred Ajayi
For over two decades, the narrative surrounding Sino-Nigerian economic relations has been framed in the soft language of global solidarity—the “win-win” bilateral partnership between the world’s most populous black nation and Asia’s economic titan. From the sprawling Lagos-Ibadan rail line to the deep-water port at Lekki built by Tolaram, China Harbour Engineering, Lagos State and NPA as well as airport terminals in Abuja and Kano, Beijing’s footprint in Nigeria is unmistakable. Yet, step back from the ribbon-cutting ceremonies, examine the trade ledgers, and a sharper reality emerges.
This is not an equal partnership of strategic equals but a classic asymmetrical trade relationship. While China extracts crucial primary commodities and secures a captive export market, Nigeria trades long-term fiscal space, industrial competitiveness and policy flexibility for critical infrastructure.
At its core, the exchange between Abuja and Beijing follows a classic commodity-for-manufactures trade pattern. Nigeria functions primarily as a primary resource pool for Chinese industrial expansion. Nigeria exports raw, unprocessed commodities: petroleum gas & crude oil: valued at roughly $2.2 billion in 2024.
It also gives solid minerals including lithium, columbite, tantalite, tin, lead and zinc, exported as raw earths before value can be added locally. The country also exports raw agricultural products like sesame seeds, cashews, and cocoa.
For all these, China offers things which Nigeria’s underfunded budget cannot provide. Among them is critical infrastructure: railways, power plants such as the Zungeru Hydroelectric Power Project, and modern sea ports funded via concessional loans from the Export-Import Bank of China.
China also supplies affordable consumer electronics, textiles, batteries, solar equipment, and machinery that sustain Nigeria’s massive informal economy.
Experts have always lamented about the unequal trade relations between the two countries. Out of the total trade exchange between both countries in 2024, 89.5% represents goods flowing from China into Nigeria. Nigeria’s sales back to China make up a tiny 10.5% fraction.
For every $1.00 worth of goods Nigeria manages to export to China, China ships $8.50 worth of goods back into Nigeria. While China sends over high-value industrial assets including over $2.1B in electronics, over $1.3B in heavy machinery, and around $800M in motor vehicles, Nigeria’s total exports to China stand at a modest $2.37B, composed overwhelmingly of raw materials like crude oil, petroleum gas, and mineral ores.
According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 30 per cent of goods imported into Nigeria between January and March 2025 (3 out of every 10 imported products in Nigeria) originated from China.
What the imbalance means
China’s huge trade surplus – nearly $18 billion in 2023, increase pressure on Nigeria’s foreign exchange market because Nigerian businesses must constantly source USD to pay for Chinese imports.
While Nigerian markets are flooded with low-cost Chinese manufactured products, Nigerian manufacturers are plagued by grid failures and structural inflation which make it impossible for them to compete. This is gradually placing sustained pressure on domestic manufacturing clusters such as Lagos, Kano and Aba.
The Dependency Theory of International Relations best explains this imbalance. Pioneered by scholars like Raúl Prebisch and expanded by Immanuel Wallerstein, the theory argues that the global economic system is structured to keep developing nations (“the Periphery”) dependent on wealthy nations (“the Core”).
China acts in this case is the industrial Core, while Nigeria operates as the commodity-supplying Periphery. Nigeria exports low-value raw materials and buys back high-value finished goods manufactured from those very materials. The terms of trade naturally favor the Core, trapping Nigeria in a cycle of structural underdevelopment and balance-of-payment deficits.
From the Structural Realism (Neorealism) point of view as articulated by Kenneth Waltz, state interaction is governed by the distribution of power within an anarchic international system, where states act in their own self-interest.
China’s engagements via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are not altruistic aid but strategic power projections designed to secure raw material supply chains, open new markets for surplus production capacity, and build geopolitical influence across Africa. Nigeria, lacking a coherent counter-strategy, engages state-to-state from a position of economic vulnerability.
In the final analysis, available trade and investment data suggest China derives greater economic benefits, which is best described as China’s strategic wins and Nigeria’s conditional gains. China receives resource security, commercial outlets for its state-owned enterprises, loan interest, and political leverage. On its part, Nigeria receives vital infrastructure which is certainly valuable but pays for it through mounting external debt obligations, loss of local manufacturing jobs, and a deepening trade deficit.
Why Nigeria is losing
Nigeria’s underperformance in its relationship with China must not be primarily blamed on China. It results from domestic policy failures, weak negotiation, and structural inertia.
Unlike Beijing approaches Africa with clear, centralized 20-year strategic plans, Nigeria approaches China reactively on a project-by-project basis. Nigeria has continued to export raw lithium, crude oil, and solid minerals without consistently enforcing local value-addition requirements.
Nigeria needs to emulate Indonesia, which banned the export of raw nickel, forcing foreign investors to build local smelters. The political will is currently lacking.
There are also the weak technology transfer clauses. Infrastructure contracts often lack enforceable technology-transfer provisions. Consequently, many projects rely on imported technical personnel for specialized positions.
Also disturbing is the domestic production deficits. High energy costs, poor port logistics, and macroeconomic volatility make Nigerian products non-competitive globally, preventing domestic businesses from taking advantage of trade access to Chinese markets.
On a positive note, Chinese investment in manufacturing, telecommunications, mining, and special economic zones has created jobs and transferred some industrial capacity. Companies such as Huawei, ZTE, and Chinese vehicle assemblers have established a presence in Nigeria.
While these investments demonstrate that the relationship extends beyond trade, they remain relatively small compared with the scale of manufactured imports, limiting their ability to offset Nigeria’s widening trade imbalance.
The path forward
Bilateral economic ties do not have to remain a one-way street. If Nigeria intends to reset its economic relationship with Beijing, it must shift from being a passive consumer of loans to an assertive strategic partner.
There is need to mandate local content and value addition through the enforcement of strict processing requirements on exported raw materials (lithium, crude, agricultural produce) before they leave Nigerian ports.
The Nigerian government must also prioritize joint ventures by requiring that Chinese manufacturers looking to access the Nigerian consumer market must set up local assembly plants. This will help to drive industrialization and job creation.
Nigeria must also demand genuine technological transfer. To achieve this, contract terms must be structured to mandate training programs and senior engineering integration for local professionals.
Until Abuja approaches Beijing with clear national priorities, an insistence on local industrialization, and a unified strategy, the partnership will continue to enrich the Chinese dragon while leaving the Nigerian elephant with the crumbs.
